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Fundamentals of Accounting Losses 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines accounting and non-accounting 
factors behind accounting losses over a fifty-year period. Using 
multivariate time-series analysis, we report evidence that the annual 
percentage of losses for U.S. firms is significantly related to accounting 
conservatism, Compustat coverage of small firms, real firm performance 
as measured by cash flows from operations, and business cycle factors. 
We further find that non-accounting factors tend to play the dominant role 
in explaining accounting losses over our sample period. Our results are 
robust to alternative definitions of macroeconomic productivity, as well as 
to varying model specifications. Our findings contribute to the literature 
on accounting losses and accounting conservatism and have implications 
for the use of accounting loss information in numerous settings. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Over the last fifty years, as the proportion of firms reporting negative income has 
increased, many studies have examined various aspects of accounting losses.  One strand 
of research investigates how losses relate to various outcomes, such as security valuation 
(Collins et al. 1997; Barth et al. 1998; Joos and Plesko 2005), bankruptcy (Barth et al. 
1998), and the abandonment option (Hayn 1995; Joos and Plesko 2005).  These studies 
find that non-earnings information, most prominently the book value of equity, takes on a 
higher degree of relevance for loss firms than for profit firms.  Another line of research 
examines accounting properties associated with negative income.  For example, Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) demonstrate a fall in the return on assets (ROA) over time and attribute 
this phenomenon to an increase in accounting conservatism, as reflected by non-operating 
accruals.  Joos and Plesko (2005) show that investors can assess the likelihood that a 
firm’s negative income will persist (or reverse) over time by examining cash flow and 
accrual components of losses. 
 The purpose of our study is to investigate the incremental roles that several 
fundamental non-accounting factors play in generating accounting losses over and 
beyond accounting conservatism.  Using aggregated time-series data over a fifty-year 
sample period, 1951-2001, we first show a significantly positive temporal association 
between accounting losses and accounting conservatism, a result consistent with Givoly 
and Hayn (2000).  We build on these results by adding firm size, real performance as 
measured using cash flows from operations (CFO), and business cycle effects to a 
multivariate regression of the frequency of accounting losses on conservatism and these 
additional factors.  Our main findings are twofold.  First, after controlling for accounting 
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conservatism, the frequency of accounting losses is positively related to the proportion of 
small firms reported on Compustat and negatively related to firms’ CFO and to 
macroeconomic productivity. Second, while accounting conservatism remains a 
significant determinant of accounting losses, its overall contribution is lessened 
considerably when placed alongside the other independent variables.  This effect is 
especially magnified when, as a sensitivity test, we replace loss frequency with median 
ROA and repeat our analysis; here we find that only the non-accounting factors are 
significant determinants of profitability levels over time. Overall, our results suggest that 
while both accounting and non-accounting factors are systematically related to 
accounting losses, non-accounting factors tend to play the dominant role. 
 In additional sensitivity tests, we use alternative measures of accounting 
conservatism and the business cycle in our regression analyses.  Our non-accounting 
determinants remain robust to whether we use non-operating accruals, an earnings-return 
metric (Basu 1997), or the market-to-book ratio (Beaver and Ryan 2000) as a proxy for 
accounting conservatism.  However, we find that only non-operating accruals and the 
earnings-return measures are significantly related to the frequency of losses, a finding 
consistent with the growing literature showing differences among accounting 
conservatism measures (Watts 2003, Givoly et al. 2004, and Roychowdhury and Watts 
2004).  To capture different aspects and timing of the business cycle, we use three 
measures – the yearly change in real gross domestic product (∆GDP), the yearly change 
in industrial production (∆IP) and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) 
definition of an expansion or recession.  Our results are robust to these alternative 
measures of macroeconomic productivity. 
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 We also control for time-series trends in the data in two ways. First, we take 
differences of our model inputs and find that year-to-year changes in the percentage of 
loss firms are significantly related to changes in the Compustat coverage of small firms, 
changes in real firm performance, and growth in macroeconomic productivity. In 
contrast, we find no evidence that changes in the degree of accounting conservatism are 
associated with changes in loss frequency. Next, we add a trend variable to our levels 
model and find that our inferences on the non-accounting variables are unchanged. 
 Lastly, we perform additional analysis to explore why small firms report more 
losses. We provide evidence that small firms are less diversified, have more idiosyncratic 
risk, invest more, and are more likely to fail than larger firms.  We further find that these 
firm characteristics are similarly related to loss firms vis-à-vis profit firms.  We conclude 
that the economic fundamentals of small firms contribute to their likelihood of realizing 
accounting losses over time. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in several ways.  We expand on existing 
accounting research that examines determinants behind losses by shedding light on how 
non-accounting factors are associated with negative income, after controlling for 
accounting conservatism.  Moreover, our evidence suggests that non-accounting factors, 
and firm size in particular, play the dominant role over accounting conservatism in 
determining losses. 
 We expand on our result on firm size by exploring reasons why small firms are 
more likely to report losses than larger firms.  Specifically, we show that economic 
factors intrinsic to small firms make it more likely for these firms to report losses than 
larger firms. As such, we extend recent findings by Fama and French (2001, 2004), who 
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report that smaller firms generally report lower earnings than larger firms during their 
sample periods.  
We extend the prior literature on analyzing losses by using annually-aggregated, 
market-wide data in our main empirical tests rather than firm-specific data. There are 
several advantages to taking this approach.  It allows us to relate macroeconomic 
variables to losses – in particular, our business cycle variables are time-dependent 
macroeconomic variables.  In addition, aggregating variables annually provides insights 
into the long-term time trends of our variables, while firm-specific variables do not lend 
themselves easily to this task. Aggregation also filters out idiosyncratic components of 
information that are uncorrelated across firms.  For example, Kothari et al. (2003) finds 
that aggregating earnings over time minimizes the effects of noise in firms’ earnings.  
Skinner (2004) makes a similar argument for the relation between dividends and 
earnings. 
Finally, accounting income, and losses in particular, are relevant in determining 
security valuations, bankruptcy probabilities, and abandonment options. Accounting 
earnings and losses are inputs in contracting, shareholder litigation, dividend policy, 
market listing standards, and regulatory inquiries. Our study implies that focusing on 
accounting conservatism alone could result in poor decision-making. 
  To illustrate, Hayn (1995) and Joos and Plesko (2005) examine how accounting 
data influence strings of losses, which in turn, allows managers to better evaluate its firm 
abandonment option. By discerning non-accounting determinants of losses, managers can 
better assess the permanence and risks inherent to an observe loss and decide in a timelier 
manner if and when to cease operations.  Similarly, security valuation models using net 
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income or changes in net income as independent variables could encompass non-
accounting determinants of losses as additional valuation factors for loss firms.   
With regard to contracting, Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that net income 
frequently is used in accounting-based debt covenants, either directly through a debt to 
“cash flow” ratio, where cash flow can be cash flows from operations, EBIT, or 
EBITDA, or indirectly through net worth, where net worth is diminished by accounting 
losses.  They also show that while 30% of all loans are in technical default, lenders 
appear to weigh whether violators are in financial distress, and often waive the violations 
for “healthy” firms.  Since most technical defaulters have negative income (Dichev and 
Skinner 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), understanding the fundamentals behind 
losses would assist lenders in determining when to call the loan.  Likewise, boards of 
directors can construct executive compensation contracts to minimize the effects of 
macroeconomic factors as it relates to accounting-based bonuses. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We present our hypotheses 
linking accounting losses to accounting and non-accounting factors in Section 2 and our 
regression framework in section 3.  We describe our data in Section 4 and present main 
results in section 5.  In Section 6, we discuss the results of our robustness tests. In Section 
7, we perform additional analysis examining why small firms report more losses. Finally, 
in Section 8 we summarize and conclude the paper. 
 
II. HYPOTHESES 
 Our study focuses on the associations between accounting losses and non-
accounting factors after controlling for accounting conservatism.  In this section, we 
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discuss hypotheses linking accounting losses to three non-accounting factors: Compustat 
coverage of small firms, real performance as measured using cash flows from operations, 
and macroeconomic productivity.  We begin by discussing the already established link 
between accounting losses and accounting conservatism. 
 
Accounting Conservatism 
Based on Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) findings, we expect a positive relation 
between the frequency of accounting losses and accounting conservatism.  Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) show a decline in ROA and a subsequent increase in non-operating accruals 
over time for a constant sample of 896 Compustat firms between 1951 and 1998.  Their 
results, along with no marked deterioration in CFO (scaled by total assets) for the same 
sample, support the hypothesis that the observed decrease in accounting income over 
time mirrors an increase in accounting conservatism over the same time period.   
There are several differences between our study and Givoly and Hayn (2000).   
One primary distinction is that, in contrast to their study, we use the nearly-universal 
Compustat database.  Other differences are that they use firm-specific data and analyze 
ROA, whereas we utilize an aggregated approach to study the annual frequency of 
accounting losses. 
 
Compustat Coverage of Small Firms 
We predict a positive association between the annual percentage of losses and the 
rise in the percentage of small firms appearing on the Compustat database over time.  Our 
prediction is consistent with Fama and French (2001, 2004), who report a temporal 
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increase in the percentage of small firms appearing on both the Compustat and CRSP 
databases, as well as the fact that smaller firms generally report lower earnings than 
larger firms over their sample period. 
There are several possible reasons why small firms are more likely to report 
losses than larger firms. Many small firms are in the earlier stages of development and 
therefore are less likely to be reporting positive earnings. Small firms have more 
volatility in their operations due to being less diversified, being more dependent on fewer 
customers and/or suppliers, and undertaking more risky investments. Thus, they may 
alternate between reporting positive earnings and losses. Many small firms are failing 
companies and therefore are more likely to report losses than larger firms.  Thus, we posit 
that small firms are riskier than larger firms, which in turn, results in higher incidences of 
accounting losses over time. We provide additional analysis of why small firms report 
more losses in Section 7. 
 
Business Cycle and Macroeconomic Productivity 
 We predict a negative relation between the frequency of accounting losses and 
macroeconomic productivity.1  Business cycles generally are divided into expansions, 
representing “high” growth rates in economic productivity, and recessions or 
                                                          
1 Examination of links between accounting earnings and macroeconomic factors has been relatively 
unexplored in the accounting and economic literature.  Johnson (1999) documents that earnings response 
coefficients (ERC) and earnings persistence are related to business cycles.  Stern (1955) finds a “fairly 
close correlation” between contemporaneous industrial production and “money profits in industry” in the 
United Kingdom and the United States for the years 1919-1950.  Chant (1980) reports a positive relation 
between leading money supply (M1) and current accounting earnings for 1958-1977; Levi (1980) finds a 
similar association between the change in M1 and the level of accounting earnings for 1949-1975.  Chant 
(1980), however, finds no relation between bank loans and accounting earnings, and Alessi (1964) reports 
none between inflation and accounting earnings. 
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contractions, which are declines in economic productivity levels.2   Although there are 
several measures of macroeconomic productivity, two commonly used statistics are the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and industrial production (IP).   
 As Hall (1990) shows, there are vast differences in economic variables during 
expansions and recessions.  Using data from 1919 through 1982, he finds that over all 
expansions, average real GDP rises by 6.0 percent, average real consumption rises by 4.3 
percent, and average real investment rises by 27.7 percent.  In contrast, the average 
changes over all recessions are -5.4 percent for real GDP, -0.5 percent for real 
consumption, and -27.8 percent for real investments.  These statistics suggest that firms 
invest more and that consumers spend more during periods of high macroeconomic 
productivity and conversely, firms and consumers cut expenditures during periods of low 
or negative macroeconomic productivity.  We predict that these patterns of expenditures 
will result in higher frequencies of accounting losses during recessions or periods of low 
economic productivity. 
 
Cash Flows from Operations 
 We predict a negative association between the frequency of accounting losses and 
aggregate cash flows from operations (CFO).  CFO include cash transactions involved in 
the firm’s delivering or producing goods or providing services, and therefore, we view it 
as a measure of the firm’s real performance.  In Section 5, we present evidence consistent 
with this view. 
                                                          
2 A full business cycle covers a recession and subsequent expansion.  Zarnowitz  (1985) defines a full cycle 
from the trough of one contraction to the trough of the next contraction.  He identifies ten business cycles 
from 1933 through 1982 and 30 business cycles from 1854 through 1982. 
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III. REGRESSION FRAMEWORK 
Unlike most accounting studies that use firm-specific data, we adopt a market-
wide approach, regressing the annual percentage of accounting losses for the 1951-2001 
period on four aggregated accounting and non-accounting variables.3  The basic 
regression is: 
%LOSSESt = β0 + β1CNSVt + β2SMALLt + β3BUSCYCt + β4CFOAt + εt,            (1) 
where %LOSSESt is the percentage of Compustat firms reporting accounting losses for 
year t, CNSVt is a measure of accounting conservatism for year t, SMALLt is the measure 
of the relative number of small firms in the Compustat database for year t, BUSCYCt is a 
measure of macroeconomic productivity for year t, and CFOAt is mean cash flows from 
operations divided by assets for year t.   
As described in Section 2, we choose these independent variables because they 
measure potentially significant aspects of firms’ overall earnings processes.  In addition, 
each can be delineated with relative unambiguity as either an accounting or non-
accounting factor. For example, CNSV is clearly an accounting measure in that its 
magnitude and direction depends greatly on accounting rules over time.  SMALL and 
BUSCYC basically are unrelated to accounting conservatism – SMALL depends on total 
assets and BUSCYC measures the productivity of the overall U.S. economy.  CFOA is 
intended to measure real firm performance, a “non-accounting” metric. Even though CFO 
                                                          
3 This approach is widely used in the finance literature to examine market-wide trends in market returns 
(Fama and French 1992), market volatility (Campbell et al. 2001), the equity premium (Fama and French 
2002; Claus and Thomas 2001), dividends (Fama and French 2001) and new listings (Fama and French 
2004).  Two accounting papers that use aggregated data across time are Skinner (2004), who relates 
aggregated dividends and earnings, and Kothari et al. (2003) who examine the relation between aggregated 
earnings and returns.  
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is an accounting variable, subject to accounting rules, it is relatively less susceptible to 
manipulation than accounting earnings or accruals (Dechow 1994; Dechow and Schrand 
2004). We discuss the associations among our independent variables later in the paper to 
assess the classification of these independent variables as “accounting” or “non-
accounting” factors. 
 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA DEFINITIONS AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
Sample Selection 
The sample consists of all firm-years for which net income (Compustat item no.  
172) and total assets (Compustat item no. 6) are available on the merged Compustat 
annual industrial file, including PST, full coverage, and research files.  This results in 
259,719 observations over the period 1951-2001.  The total number of firms varies from 
a low of 614 in 1951 to a high of 10,313 in 1996. 
Table 1 presents the annual frequency of losses.  The percentages vary from 
0.81% in 1951 to 45.86% in 2001.  Consistent with Hayn (1995), Collins et al. (1997), 
and Collins et al. (1999), we find that the frequency of losses has risen steadily over time.  
Frequency rates for each decade are 3.44% for 1951-1960, 7.28% for 1961-1970, 13.95% 
for 1971-1980, 30.09% for 1981-1990, and 35.96% for 1991-2001. 
 
Accounting Conservatism 
We use the same accounting conservatism measure as Givoly and Hayn (2000).  
The firm’s non-operating accruals (NOPACC) are defined as total accruals (net income 
minus cash flows from operations) plus depreciation and amortization minus operating 
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accruals (∆accounts receivable + ∆inventories + ∆prepaid expenses - ∆accounts payable - 
∆taxes payable) divided by beginning period total assets.  Removal of these items from 
total accruals leaves us primarily with gains and losses from non-operating assets, bad 
debt expense, restructuring charges, write-downs of assets, deferred income taxes, write-
offs of in-process R&D expenses, and other expenses or revenues not included in the 
operating accrual accounts.  Since most non-operating accruals are expenses or losses, we 
equate accounting conservatism of the income statement with larger negative amounts. 
We choose this measure initially over the Basu (1997) earnings-returns and 
Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) book-to-market value of equity measures for two main 
reasons.  First, NOPACC is based on accounting data only.  In contrast, the other two 
measures are market dependent.  Second, several studies (e.g., Dietrich et al. 2003; 
Givoly et al. 2004) have questioned the reliability of the earnings-return measure as a 
proxy for accounting conservatism.  In fact, Givoly et al. (2004) present evidence of a 
negative relation between the earnings-return measure and alternative accounting 
conservatism measures and point to measurement error in the earnings-return measure as 
a prime reason for these observed observations.  In section 6, we present sensitivity tests 
in which we use the earnings-returns and book-to-market measures to examine 
differences among these definitions of accounting conservatism. 
Table 2, Panel A shows the mean and median values of NOPACC by decade.  
NOPACC declines in the 1960s, remains relatively constant in the 1970s, and falls 
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.  The large negative growth in NOPACC in the latter 
period parallels those presented by Givoly and Hayn (2000) for their constant sample of 
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896 firms, ending in 1998.  Thus, while not monotonic, there nevertheless is a steady rise 
in accounting conservatism for the full Compustat sample over our time period. 
 
 Compustat Coverage of Small Firms 
We estimate SMALL by comparing the total assets of each firm to the population 
of NYSE firms (see Fama and French 2001, 2004).  For each year, we rank all NYSE 
firms by their total assets and classify as “small” all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms 
that have total assets less than the 25th percentile of NYSE firms.   
As Table 2, Panel A shows, both mean and median percentages of all firms on the 
Compustat tape classified as small rise in the 1960s but explode after 1970 to over 60% 
of the total listings.  To a great extent, this pattern parallels Compustat’s increased 
coverage of NASDAQ firms during our time period.4     For example, in 1950, NASDAQ 
firms represent 17% of the available firms on Compustat (105 out of 615).  By 1975 this 
percentage increases to 55%, and in 1997 the percentage is 67%.  
In addition, NASDAQ firms are, on average, smaller than exchange-listed firms.  
For our sample from 1970-2001, the average (median) asset size for NASDAQ firms is 
$729.1 ($650.2) million, compared to $3,653.6 ($2,594.4) million for NYSE-AMEX 
firms.  In fact, despite the success of many NASDAQ firms in the latter period, the 
differential in asset size actually grew throughout the time period.  In 1951, the average 
NYSE-AMEX firm was 1.07 times larger than the average NASDAQ firm.  By 1970, the 
                                                          
4 Unlike the CRSP database, which started covering NASDAQ stocks in 1973, the Compustat database 
contains NASDAQ-traded stocks throughout our 51 year period.  However, the degree of variability in 
SMALL is limited in the first 20 years of our sample period due to relatively few AMEX or NASDAQ firms 
being listed on Compustat. To overcome this potential problem, we use an alternative size measure, the 
coefficient of variation of the log of total assets (the standard deviation divided by the mean).  We obtain 
similar results with this measure; the estimated coefficient on this variable is significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels in each regression. 
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differential was 1.79; by 1992 the average NYSE-AMEX firm was 4.35 times larger than 
the average NASDAQ firm; and by 2000 the multiple reached 6.84.  There are various 
reasons behind this phenomenon.  One reason is that the NASDAQ has always had less 
stringent listing requirements than the NYSE or the AMEX.  In particular, minimum 
listing requirements for revenues and assets consistently have been lower for NASDAQ-
traded firms. 
 
The Business Cycle and Macroeconomic Productivity 
 We represent the U.S. business cycle using three alternative measures of 
macroeconomic productivity.  The first measure is an indicator based on the NBER’s 
definition of expansionary and recessionary periods.  The NBER divides the U.S. 
economy into two economic environments: expansions are from the trough to the peak of 
business growth, where business growth is measured in total output, income, and 
employment (see also Moore 1983), and recessions are measured from the peak to the 
trough. The NBER uses monthly data such as changes in retail sales, the unemployment 
rate, real wages, and industrial production (see www.nber.org and Hall 1990) to delineate 
peaks and troughs.  As shown in Table 2, Panel B, during 1951-2001, there were nine 
NBER recession periods and nine NBER expansions.  We define the variable RECESS as 
equaling one if any part of a recessionary period occurs within a calendar year and zero 
otherwise.  Other papers using the NBER definition include Johnson (1999) and Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002).  
 The other two measures are the annual percentage change in real gross domestic 
product (∆GDP), and the annual percentage change in total industrial production (∆IP). 
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GDP is compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce and includes personal 
consumption, government expenditures, private investment, inventory growth and the 
trade balance (see www.BEA.gov). Papers using ∆GDP as a macroeconomic measure of 
business productivity include Hall (1990) and Cochrane (1991). Although corporate 
profits are a component of GDP, we note that from 1979 through 2001, net income (after 
tax) makes up less than eight percent of GDP (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2004) 
and has fluctuated within the 15-17 percent range after World War II (Financial Times 
2004).  Therefore, examining the relation between accounting losses and ∆GDP does not 
necessarily impose a mechanistic relation between the two.  IP, like GDP, measures total 
real output, but is more limited in scope.  It is compiled by the Federal Reserve and 
includes total production in manufacturing, mining, gas and electric utilities (see 
www.federalreserve.gov). Previous studies using ∆IP as a measure of business 
productivity include Fama (1981) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). We obtained the 
data for ∆GDP and ∆IP from “Economagic.com: Economic Time Series.” 
Table 2, Panel A contains the means and medians by decade for ∆GDP and ∆IP. 
Unlike the data on NOPACC and SMALL, ∆GDP and ∆IP do not trend upwards or 
downwards over time. Instead, we note a higher growth in ∆GDP and ∆IP during the 
1960s, followed by a deterioration of economic productivity over the 1970s and 1980s, 
followed by a subsequent rise in the 1990s.  
 
Cash Flows from Operations  
CFOA is CFO divided by beginning total assets averaged across firms for each 
year.  We define CFO according to GAAP.  For the years 1987-2001, CFO is annual 
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Compustat item number 308.  From 1971-1986, it is funds from operations (item number 
110) minus the change in working capital (∆current assets + ∆debt in current liabilities - 
∆current liabilities - ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation expense plus the change in deferred taxes minus the change in working 
capital (see Rayburn 1987).5   
As shown in the last two columns of Table 2, Panel A, CFOA has declined 
precipitously over time, dropping from a mean (median) of 0.101 (0.104) in the 1950s to 
0.013 (0.016) in the 1991-2001 period.  Consistent with Joos and Plesko (2005), we also 
note a drop in CFOA from 1971-1990 to 1991-2001.  Both our and Joos and Plesko’s 
findings are in contrast to Givoly and Hayn (2000), who find no marked deterioration in 
CFOA over time.  However, Givoly and Hayn (2000) examine a smaller constant-firm 
sample, which by construction asks a different set of questions than those addressed 
here.6 
 
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Empirical Issues 
We estimate equation (1) using RECESS, ∆GDP and ∆IP as alternative measures 
of BUSCYC.  Before presenting the results, we discuss several statistical considerations.  
First, our research design is biased against finding significant coefficients on the business 
cycle because there is not perfect overlap between the timing of the expansions and 
                                                          
5 As a sensitivity check, we use the Rayburn (1987) definition of CFO for all years and rerun our regression 
analyses with this variable.  The coefficient and significance level on CFO with the Rayburn measure is 
qualitatively the same as with CFO defined above. 
 
6 If we limit our analysis to a constant sample over 1951-2001, we similarly find no significant decrease in 
CFOA over time, consistent with Givoly and Hayn (2000). 
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contractions and %LOSSES. That is, %LOSSES is measured on an annual basis, but 
business cycles begin and end over varying time periods.  Thus, our results will be 
sensitive to possible mismatching between the business cycles and the accounting 
measurement period. 
Second, as we show in Table 3, there is a great deal of collinearity among the 
independent variables. For example, CFOA is highly positively correlated with NOPACC 
(Pearson ρ = 0.5471; p = 0.0001) and negatively correlated with SMALL (Pearson ρ = –
0.8134; p = 0.0001), implying that the drop in CFOA has mirrored the rise in non-
operating accruals and the percentage of small firms over time.  Thus, omitting CFOA 
from the regression would result in upwardly biased coefficients on NOPACC and 
SMALL that is due to an omitted correlated variable problem.  Similarly, SMALL and 
NOPACC are highly negatively correlated (Pearson ρ = -0.4784; p = 0.0004), suggesting 
that omitting either variable from the regression on %LOSSES would produce an 
upwardly biased coefficient on the remaining variable.  These correlations have 
implications both for our study and for interpretations of other studies, as they imply that 
examining bivariate associations between accounting losses (accounting earnings) and a 
single variable in isolation may result in biased inferences. 
Third, CFOA is uncorrelated with the business cycle variables.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between CFOA and RECESS is 0.2141 (p=0.1314); between 
CFOA and ∆GDP it is 0.1039 (p=0.4679) and between CFOA and ∆IP it is 0.0667 
(p=0.6418).  These correlations buttress our assertion that CFOA primarily measures 
firm-specific performance as opposed to being a reflection of the business cycle.   
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Fourth, although CFOA is uncorrelated with the business cycle variables, it is 
related significantly to %LOSSES (Pearson ρ = -0.9428; p = 0.0001). Therefore, omitting 
CFOA from regression (1) leads to an upwardly biased estimator of the variance of β3, 
leading to an acceptance of the null hypothesis more frequently than is justified by the 
given level of significance (Kmenta 1971).   
 
Regression Results 
The regressions results are presented in Table 4.  We begin by examining the 
simple regression of %LOSSES on accounting conservatism (NOPACC) alone.  
Consistent with Givoly and Hayn (2000), we find a negative relation between the 
percentage of accounting losses over time and NOPACC.  The regression coefficient on 
NOPACC is -3.359, with a t-statistic of -5.62 (p-value < 0.01).  Because more negative 
levels of NOPACC indicate greater accounting conservatism, these findings are 
consistent with the view that the annual percent of accounting losses is positively related 
to the degree of accounting conservatism.  The adjusted R2 is 38.0% indicating that 
38.0% of the variation in the percentage of annual losses can be explained by accounting 
conservatism alone.  Thus, we corroborate Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) results for a larger 
sample of firms. 
In model 2, SMALL is added to the regression.  The estimated coefficient on 
SMALL is 0.796, with a t-statistic of 12.55 (p-value < 0.01).  Thus, as predicted, the 
temporal increase in the percentage of accounting losses is mirrored by the temporal 
increase in SMALL.  The adjusted R2 is 85.2%, compared to an adjusted R2 of 38.0% for 
the simple regression of %LOSSES on NOPACC.  Testing for the incremental 
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explanatory power of adding SMALL yields an F-statistic of 67.1, significant at the 1% 
level, supporting the hypothesis that %LOSSES depends not only on NOPACC, but also 
on SMALL.   
The drop in the estimated coefficient on NOPACC from -3.359 in model 1 to -
1.252 in model 2 reflects the -0.59 correlation between NOPACC and SMALL that we 
documented in Table 3.7  Nonetheless, both variables provide significant explanatory 
power over the frequency of accounting losses even in the presence of this 
multicollinearity. 
 In models 3 through 5, we add the business cycle (RECESS, ∆GDP, or ∆IP) and 
cash flows from operations (CFOA) to the multivariate regression.  As these regressions 
show, there are significant associations between %LOSSES and the business cycle 
variables.  The coefficients on ∆GDP and ∆IP are significantly negative at the 1% level, 
indicating that %LOSSES is negatively related to macroeconomic growth.  The 
coefficient on RECESS is significantly positive at the 1% level; i.e., %LOSSES are higher 
for years in which there is a recession.  
The coefficients on CFOA are also significantly negative, consistent with the view 
that accounting losses are negatively related to the company’s firm-specific economic 
productivity.  For both regressions, the estimated coefficient on CFOA is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The regression coefficients on SMALL (NOPACC) remain 
                                                          
7 The significant correlation between NOPACC and SMALL raises the question of whether SMALL is truly 
a “non-accounting” factor, as we claim. Although the two variables are highly correlated, a regression of 
NOPACC on SMALL and a time trend variable reveals that only the trend variable is significant in 
explaining NOPACC levels over time, consistent with our characterization of SMALL as unrelated to 
accounting conservatism. 
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significantly positive (negative), with the exception of model 5, in which NOPACC is 
negative but insignificantly different from zero.8 
To examine the effects of adding these variables to the model, we compare the 
coefficients on NOPACC and SMALL from models 3 - 5 to the regression on NOPACC 
and SMALL alone (model 2).  The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on NOPACC 
drops from -1.252 to -0.491 in model 3, -0.621 in model 4, and -0.330 in model 5.  The 
coefficient on SMALL drops from 0.796 in model 2 to around 0.375 in models 3-5.  The 
explanation behind these declines lies in the significant negative correlations between 
CFOA and NOPACC and between CFOA and SMALL. That is, adding CFOA to the 
regression model reduces the biases in these coefficients.  
In summary, we find that accounting losses are related to both accounting 
conservatism and non-accounting factors.  Specifically, the percentage of losses is 
directly related to accounting conservatism and the percentage of small firms on 
Compustat’s database; they are inversely related to the business cycle and to cash flows 
from operations.  Thus, non-accounting fundamentals add significant incremental 
information about accounting losses over and beyond accounting conservatism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 As an alternative measure of cash flows, we use free cash flows instead of cash flows from operations.  
We define free cash flows as our CFO measure minus capital expenditures (annual Compustat item #128).  
The correlation between CFO and free cash flows is 0.94.  When we substitute free cash flows for CFO in 
models (3) through (5), we find that the results are qualitatively the same, but weaker.  For example, in 
model (4), the adjusted R2 falls to 87.8% and the intercept becomes insignificantly different from zero.  We 
thus conclude that CFO is a better indicator of real firm performance than free cash flows. 
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VI.  ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Using ROA as the Dependent Variable 
In this section, we examine whether our results apply only to losses or whether 
they can be generalized to net income-to-total assets (hereafter ROA). Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) define profitability as ROA and show a relation between the deterioration of ROA 
over time and the rise of accounting conservatism.  Since this paper builds on their work, 
we consider whether our findings hold for ROA over time as well as losses.  Further, by 
understanding the non-accounting fundamentals behind ROA, academics and other users 
of accounting income can better utilize and interpret net income in general. 
We estimate the following regression:  
ROAt = β0 + β1NOPACCt + β2SMALLt + β3BUSCYCt + β4CFOAt + εt,             (2) 
where ROAt is the median ROA for year t. We measure ROA as net income (annual 
Compustat item number 172) divided by beginning period total assets. 
 Table 5, Panel A presents the mean and median ROA by decade.  Consistent with 
Givoly and Hayn (2000), there is a steady deterioration of ROA over time.  In the 1950s, 
the median ROA is 0.068.  By the 1980s, the median ROA is less than half that amount 
(0.031), and it falls by almost 50% again in the 1990s (0.016).  The mean ROA shows 
similar declines, turning negative in the 1980s and remaining negative throughout the 
1990s.  
Table 5, Panel B shows the summary statistics for equation (2) using the three 
definitions of macroeconomic productivity. The results complement those presented in 
Table 4.  The estimated coefficients on SMALL, ∆GDP, RECESS, and CFOA are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% levels and are in the predicted directions.  ∆IP 
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is significantly positive at the 10% level, and NOPACC, the accounting conservatism 
variable, is insignificantly different from zero.  The adjusted R2 values for the regressions 
with ROA are comparable to those reported with %LOSSES as the dependent variable.  
We conclude that the analyses presented thus far are fairly robust to whether we examine 
determinants behind accounting losses or income levels, in general.  In particular, we find 
that non-accounting factors influence losses and ROA in similar ways. 
 
Alternative Measures of Accounting Conservatism 
 Several studies assess alternative measures of accounting conservatism and 
conclude these measures reflect different aspects of the accounting process (Watts 2003; 
Givoly et al. 2004; and Roychowdhury and Watts 2004).  To examine the extent to which 
differing accounting conservatism measures affect our regression analyses, we use two 
commonly-used alternative measures as substitutes for NOPACC.  
 The first measure is Basu’s (1997) earnings-returns (E-R) metric, which is the γ2 
coefficient in the following regression: 
EPSit/Pricei,t-1 = α0 + α1DUMit + γ1RETURNit + γ2 (RETURNit * DUMit) + εit,    (3) 
where the i and t subscripts denote the firm and year, respectively; EPS is annual earnings 
per share; Price is the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year, DUM is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the stock return is negative and zero otherwise; and RETURN is 
the year’s stock return. Individual stock returns are computed over the twelve-month 
period beginning nine months prior to the end of fiscal year t.  Under Basu’s (1997) 
methodology, γ2 (E-R) is expected to be positive.  The underlying notion behind this 
premise is that, with conservative accounting, earnings reflect bad news more quickly 
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than they reflect good news.  Thus, we predict a positive relation between %LOSSES and 
E-R. 
The second measure is the annual market-to-book ratio of equity (see Beaver and 
Ryan 2000).  This measure of conservatism recognizes that the market’s valuation of a 
firm’s assets and liabilities can differ substantially from the book value of these assets 
and liabilities.  A ratio greater than one indicates accounting conservatism of the balance 
sheet.  Accounting reasons for the discrepancies between market and book value of 
equity include non-recognition of intangibles (e.g., R&D, brand names, and market 
shares), using historical costs instead of market values for property, plant and equipment, 
and off-balance sheet financings and contingencies.  We predict a positive relation 
between %LOSSES and the market-to-book ratio (MB). 
 Table 6, Panel A shows the mean and median values for E-R and MB by decade.  
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Basu 1997), mean and median E-R increase over 
time, peaking during the 1980s, but still remaining relatively high in the 1990s.  In 
contrast, MB increases between the 1950s and 1960s, dips dramatically in the 1960s, then 
rises precipitously over the next two decades.  Comparing E-R and MB to NOPACC and 
to each other suggests that the individual accounting conservatism measures are picking 
up different aspects of financial reporting.9 
Panel B contains the regression results; models 1-3 present the estimated 
coefficients on E-R, and models 4-6 show the coefficients on MB.  As Panel B shows, the 
non-accounting variables, SMALL, BUSCYC, and CFOA are robust to each accounting 
conservatism metric.  In all six regressions, the coefficients on the non-accounting 
                                                          
9 The Pearson correlation coefficient between NOPACC and MB is -0.18 (p=0.20); the coefficient between 
NOPACC and E-R is -0.21 (p=0.14); and the coefficient between MB and E-R is 0.03 (p=0.84). 
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variables are statistically significant at conventional levels, with all but one variable 
significant at the 5% or 1% levels.   
In contrast, we find very different statistical results for the accounting 
conservatism variables.  In models 1-3, E-R is statistically positive at the 5% or 1% 
levels, indicating a significant association between %LOSSES and the E-R conservatism 
measure.  In models 4-6, the estimated coefficients on MB are insignificantly different 
from zero, suggesting no relation between MB and accounting losses.  Further, when we 
compare the coefficients in Table 6 to those in Table 4 (where we used NOPACC as our 
measure of accounting conservatism), we see that using E-R has no tangible affects on 
the estimated coefficients on BUSCYC and CFOA, but diminishes the coefficient on 
SMALL.  Conversely, using MB has no discernible impact on the coefficients on 
BUSCYC and SMALL, but reduces the coefficients on CFOA.  We find that the primary 
causes of these differences are reflected in the correlations between the independent 
variables.  E-R and SMALL have a 0.63 correlation statistic, and MB and CFOA have a 
correlation coefficient of -0.42.  Thus, consistent with Givoly et al. (2004) and 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2004), we find differences in accounting conservatism 
metrics.  However, we also find that these differences contribute little to our 
interpretation of how non-accounting factors relate to accounting losses. 
 
How Important are Time-Series Trends?  
 The results reported thus far are based on regressions in which one level variable 
is regressed on several other level variables.  As Table 4 shows, both the t-statistics on 
the coefficients and the R2 value for the full regression are high.  However, two of the 
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independent variables, SMALL and CFOA, display either upward or downward trends, as 
does the dependent variable, %LOSSES.  These trends raise several questions.  First, are 
the high R2 values reported in Table 4 related to these trends?  Second, and perhaps more 
important, to what extent do these trends contribute to the documented rise in accounting 
losses over time?  Finally, after controlling for the trends, what role does the business 
cycle play in explaining accounting losses? 
We begin answering these questions by noting that the Durbin-Watson statistics 
for the regressions reported in Table 4 are significant at the 1% level, suggesting some 
degree of autocorrelation among the residuals.  To control for the autocorrelation in the 
disturbances in the regression models and to remove possible trends in the data, we 
perform two separate tests.  First, we transform the data into first differences and rerun 
the regression analyses on the transformed data. The regression model is: 
∆%LOSSESt = β0 + β1∆NOPACCt + β2∆SMALLt  + β3BUSCYCt + β4∆CFOAt + εt,  (4) 
where ∆ is the one-year change.  The subscript t refers to the change between years t-1 
and t.  Note that all variables except the business cycle variables (∆GDP, ∆IP, and 
RECESS) have been differenced to take out their trend factors. We do not difference our 
business cycle variables, as they are already expressed as a change from the prior year. 
 Second, we incorporate a time trend factor, TREND, into the original levels 
regression, where TREND is defined as the calendar year minus 1950. The regression 
model is as follows: 
%LOSSESt=β0 +β1NOPACCt +β2SMALLt +β3BUSCYCt +β4CFOAt + β5TRENDt +εt.  (5)   
The difference between (4) and (5) reflects dissimilar statistical artifacts.  
Equation (4) corrects for the presence of a first degree autocorrelation process in the 
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dependent and independent variables.  Including the trend factor in equation (5) is a 
correct procedure for eliminating the presence of a time-stationary process. 
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for each regression. In Panel A, 
∆%LOSSES is significantly related to ∆GDP, ∆IP, and RECESS at the 1% levels.  Thus, 
the yearly change in the percentage of losses is significantly related to the business cycle, 
suggesting that changes in the frequency of accounting losses are exaggerated or 
attenuated by the business cycle.  ∆%LOSSES is also positively and significantly 
associated with ∆SMALL, the change in the percentage of small firms in the Compustat 
database.  Thus, as relatively more small firms are added (or removed) each year from 
Compustat’s coverage, the percentage of accounting losses increases or decreases as well.  
For the two regressions with ∆IP and RECESS, ∆%LOSSES is significantly negatively 
related to the annual change in CFOA, supporting our earlier finding that accounting 
losses are inversely related to cash flows from operations.  The main difference between 
the levels-based and changes-based regressions, however, is in the significance levels for 
NOPACC vis-à-vis ∆NOPACC.  Whereas in Table 4, NOPACC is significantly negative 
for two of the three levels-based models, none of the coefficients on ∆NOPACC is 
significantly different from zero in the changes-based models.  Thus, over time, there 
appears to be no systematic relation between changes in the frequency of accounting 
losses and changes in the degree of accounting conservatism, ceteris paribus. 
The adjusted R2 values for the models are 32.1%, 57.1% and 30.0%, respectively.  
Although the explanatory power for the changes regressions are lower than that for the 
levels regressions, they still suggest that a significant amount of variation in the change in 
the percentage of losses is picked up by changes in non-accounting variables. The 
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Durbin-Watson statistics for each regression are insignificantly different from zero, 
implying that the autocorrelation factors have been removed.  The insignificant 
coefficients on ∆NOPACC and the reduced significance levels on ∆SMALL and ∆CFOA 
suggest that much of the time-series correction is coming from these three factors. 
Table 7, Panel B contains the regression results for the levels-based equation with 
a time-trend factor included as an additional independent variable.  The estimated 
coefficient on the trend factor is insignificantly different from zero (t-statistics range from 
1.18 to 1.28) for the three regressions.  In addition, the interpretation of the independent 
variables with respect to their relation to %LOSSES is unaffected by the inclusion of a 
time-trend factor.  However, consistent with the changes-based regressions, the t-
statistics on SMALL and CFOA drop dramatically from those reported in Table 4.  For 
example, for the regression using ∆GDP to measure macroeconomic productivity , the t-
statistic for SMALL drops from 6.55 in Table 4 to 3.02 in Table 7.  Similarly, the t-
statistic for CFOA declines from -8.82 to -4.88.  In contrast, there is little to no change in 
the t-statistics for NOPACC or for the business cycle variables.  Thus, as with the 
changes-based analysis, adding the trend factor corrects for the time-series properties of 
the SMALL and CFOA variables. 
 
VII.  WHY DO SMALL FIRMS REPORT MORE LOSSES? 
 Our results are consistent with the view that that the increasing percentage of 
small firms on Compustat is a major reason for the increase in the percentage of firms 
reporting losses over time.  In our hypothesis section, we posited several reasons behind 
this phenomenon:  small firms are less diversified, they are more risky, and they are more 
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likely to be in the early or later stages of their life cycle.  In this section, we investigate 
the associations among small firms, losses, and these variables. 
 First, we posit that small firms are less diversified. If small firms are less 
diversified, then they are limited in their abilities to offset losses from one line of 
business against gains from another line of business.  One direct way to measure this is to 
compare the number of reporting segments between small and other firms. Firms with 
only one segment are the least able to offset losses. We therefore predict that small firms 
are more likely to be single-segmented.  We also predict that the likelihood of reporting a 
loss is higher for firms with a single business segment.   
 Second, we propose that small firms have more volatility in their operations and 
therefore are more likely to report losses in one year and profits in another year. In 
contrast, larger firms have more smoothed performances in their operations and 
consequently are less likely to report losses in any given year. One way to measure 
operations volatility is to examine the idiosyncratic component of the firm’s variance of 
daily stock returns over the year.  Campbell et al. (2001) specifically link idiosyncratic 
stock volatility to the variance of cash-flow shocks.  We predict that small firms have 
higher idiosyncratic risk than larger firms, and consequently, the likelihood of a firm 
reporting a loss is positively related to its idiosyncratic risk over time. 
 Third, we posit that small firms are more likely to be in the beginning or ending 
stages of their life cycles.  Fama and French (2004) show that from 1980-1989, 89.7 
percent of new common stock listings (IPOs and non-IPOs) were in the zero to twentieth 
percentile of market equity based on all stocks trading on the NYSE in the month of the 
listing.  From 1990-2000, 72.0 percent of new listings were in the zero to twentieth 
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percentile of market equity.  Fama and French (2004) also demonstrate that the 
percentage of new listings reporting accounting losses in their first year was 44.2 percent 
in 1980-1989 and 44.2 percent in 1990-2000 for IPOs, and was 44.6 percent in 1989-
1989 and 51.6 percent in 1990-2000 for non-IPO new listings.  Taken together, their 
results suggest that many small firms are in the beginning of their life cycle and that 
newly-listed firms have a high probability of showing an accounting loss in its listing 
year.  We therefore propose that firm size is positively related to it being a new listing 
and that the likelihood of a firm reporting an accounting loss is positively related to 
whether it is a new listing.   We also hypothesize that small firms in the earlier stages of 
development invest more heavily in long-term assets and research and development than 
larger firms and so are less likely to be reporting positive cash flows from operations 
and/or positive net income.  We therefore posit that small firms will have more negative 
CFI (with R&D included) than larger firms and that the likelihood of a firm reporting an 
accounting loss is negatively related to its investing cash flows. 
 Barth et al. (1998) show that firms delisting from Compustat because of 
bankruptcy between 1975-1993 have, in the year prior to delisting, mean assets of 
$133.85 million and mean net income of -$67.93 million.  They also demonstrate that 
over 1988 - 1993, financially healthier firms have substantially higher market values of 
equity and net income than firms with lower financial health.  Their findings suggest that 
many small firms are in the end of their life-cycle and that these firms are more likely to 
report losses in their delisting year.  Consequently, we posit that small firms are more 
frequently delisted and that accounting losses are related to whether a firm delists. 
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 Data on the number of business segments are from Compustat’s segment detail 
file. SEG1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has only one business segment 
and zero otherwise. Segment data are available from 1985 onwards.  Idiosyncratic risk 
(IDVOL) is the standard deviation of the residual from a firm-specific regression of daily 
returns on the equally-weighted CRSP market portfolio returns, estimated annually.  
NEW is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm appears for the first time in year t on 
the Compustat tape and zero otherwise.  DELIST is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm’s history on the Compustat research tape ends at year t and zero otherwise.  CFI is 
cash flows from investing (annual Compustat item 311) minus research and development 
expense (annual Compustat item 46), divided by total assets.  These data are available 
from 1987 onwards. 
 We perform both univariate and multivariate analyses.  Because our data on CFI 
begin in 1987, we limit our analysis to firms listed on Compustat in 1987-2001.  Since 
this gives us only fifteen years of data, we do not use annually-aggregated data; instead 
we use firm specific data.  Thus, SMALLFIRM is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm is at or below the 25th percentile of NYSE assets for that year and zero otherwise.  
LOSSFIRM is a dummy variable equal to one is the firm has negative net income in that 
year and zero otherwise. 
 Table 8, Panel A presents the univariate tests on differences in firm characteristics 
for small/large firms and for loss/profit firms.  As the panel shows, small firms are 
significantly more likely to have only one business segment, have greater idiosyncratic 
risk, have proportionally higher numbers of delistings, and have more negative CFI than 
larger firms.  Specifically, on average, 79.08 percent of small firms have one business 
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segment compared to 56.98 percent of large firms (t-statistic for differences between 
means = 65.45, significant at > 0.001 level).  Small firms’ idiosyncratic risk is 0.0536, 
compared to 0.0264 for large firms (t-statistic = 163.47, significant at the > 0.001 level).  
CFI is -0.1340 for small firms, against -0.1120 for large firms (t-statistic = -17.92, 
significant at the > 0.001 level).  On average, 7.12 percent of small firms delist compared 
to 4.93 percent of large firms that delist (t-statistic = 12.35, significant at the >0.001 
level).  On average, however, there is no difference between the percentages of new 
listings between small and large firms (t-statistic = 1.55, insignificant at the 0.10 level).  
Thus, small firms are less diversified, more risky, have more negative levels of investing 
cash flows and are more likely to be at the end of their life cycles than larger firms.  
Comparing median values produce similar results and conclusions. 
 As the right side of Panel A shows, there are similar mappings in firm 
characteristics for loss firms vis-à-vis profit firms.  The percentage of loss firms with 
only one reporting segment is significantly greater than the percentage of profit firms – 
75.66 percent against 65.27 percent (t-statistic = 28.43, significant at the >0.001 level).10  
Loss firms’ idiosyncratic risk is 0.0583 compared to 0.0322 for profit firms (t-statistic = -
122.45, significant at the >0.001 level).11 Loss firms invest more heavily than profit firms 
– CFI is -0.1427 for loss firms and -0.1141 for profit firms (t-statistic = 18.33, significant 
                                                          
10 We also examine the number of segments itself and find similar results.  Small firms have, on average, 
1.35 business segments whereas larger firms have, on average, 2.02 business segments (t-statistic = 75.88).  
Loss firms, on average, have 1.47 business segments and profit firms have 1.76 business segments (t-
statistic = 33.81).  We also note, however, that during our time period, there was a change in reporting 
standards regarding segment reporting.  SFAS 131 became effective for fiscal years beginning on or after 
January 1, 1998.  Two outcomes of the change was that more firms reported in greater numbers of lines of 
businesses and that fewer firms reported just one business segment (see Street et al. 2000).  These results 
work against our hypothesis since the percentage of firms reporting losses after 1997 rose but the 
percentage of firms reporting one segment dropped. 
11 This finding complements Ertimur (2005), who finds that loss firms have higher levels of information 
asymmetry than profit firms. 
  31 
 
at the >0.001 level).  On average, 8.35 percent firms delist in a loss year compared to 
4.96 percent of firms that delist in a profitable year (t-statistic = 16.55, significant at the 
>0.001 level).   Comparing medians produce similar results and conclusions, with only 
median CFI not being statistically different from each other. 
 In Panel B, we present multivariate probit analyses of SMALLFIRM and 
LOSSFIRM on the same firm characteristics. Because firms appear repeatedly from year-
to-year, we show both pooled-regression and Fama-MacBeth coefficients and test 
statistics. As Panel B shows, the probit models yield similar results to the univariate 
analyses.  SMALLFIRM is significantly and positively related to SEG1 and IDVOL and is 
significantly and negatively related to CFI.  The evidence on NEW and DELIST is mixed, 
with NEW being significantly positive for the pooled-sample results only and DELIST 
being significantly positive for the Fama-MacBeth results only.  LOSSFIRM is 
significantly and positively related to SEG1, IDVOL, NEW, and DELIST and is 
significantly negatively related to CFI.   
 In summary, we provide some intuition behind the finding that small firms are 
more likely to report losses than larger firms.  We show that in 1987-2001, small firms 
are less diversified, have higher idiosyncratic risk, more negative levels of CFI (including 
R&D expenditures), and are more likely to be at the end of their life cycle than larger 
firms.  We also show that firms with similar characteristics are more likely to record an 
accounting loss for the year than a profit.   
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VIII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines accounting and non-accounting fundamentals behind 
accounting losses over the fifty-year period 1951-2001.  We examine four factors: 
accounting conservatism, Compustat coverage of small firms, real firm performance as 
measured by operating cash flows, and macroeconomic productivity.  Consistent with 
previous studies, we find a positive relation between the frequency of firms reporting 
negative income over time and accounting conservatism, where accounting conservatism 
is defined as non-operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000).  However, in the overall 
scheme of our analyses, accounting conservatism appears to play a relatively small role 
in determining the frequency of losses.  Instead, we find accounting losses to be 
significantly related to the non-accounting factors we examine.  Our results also hold 
when relating ROA to the same factors and are robust to alternative definitions of 
accounting conservatism and business cycle variables.   
 Our study makes the following two contributions.  First, we expand on extant 
research that examines the determinants of accounting losses. Consistent with prior 
studies, we document a significant association between losses and accounting 
conservatism.  Our contribution arises by demonstrating that non-accounting factors, 
most notably firm size and the business cycle, also play significant roles in explaining the 
incidence of accounting losses over time. 
Second, our study has implications regarding the efficient use of accounting loss 
information. Accounting income, and losses in particular, are relevant for determining 
security valuations, bankruptcy probabilities, and abandonment options.  Accounting 
earnings and losses are inputs in contracting, shareholder litigation, dividend policy, 
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market listing standards, and regulatory inquiries. By improving our understanding of 
how losses are generated, users and practitioners can better interpret the meaning of 
accounting losses. 
The study has several limitations. First, our use of cash flows from operating 
activities as our measure of real firm performance may be imperfect due to manipulation 
of cash flows. The recent cases of Worldcom and Parmalat demonstrate that cash flow 
manipulation is a real possibility, and Roychowdhury (2004) empirically finds that firms 
manage earnings through manipulation of real activities that affect cash flows. However, 
because it appears that this phenomenon is relatively new, our use of a long time-series of 
data from 1951-2001 should mitigate its effects. In addition, Roychowhury’s (2004) 
findings suggest a negative relation between accounting losses and cash flows, not a 
positive one, as we document. Nonetheless, the possibility of cash flow manipulation 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
Second, we take an aggregate, market-wide approach to examining the 
fundamentals of accounting losses. While this research design choice has the advantage 
of allowing us to incorporate macroeconomic conditions into our analysis, which is one 
of our primary objectives, it precludes analyses and inferences regarding firm-specific 
variables, for example, interactions between accounting losses and firms’ decisions on 
how to finance its investments, its dividend policy, changes to its labor force, etc. We 
leave these analyses to future studies. 
Lastly, while our results clearly indicate that non-accounting factors are 
significant determinants of reported accounting losses, future research might more 
directly address the implications of these findings. For example, should the use of loss 
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information in security valuation, bankruptcy prediction, or credit rating determinations 
be conditioned on current macroeconomic productivity, firm size, or real firm 
performance? This is one possible avenue of inquiry that future research might explore. 
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TABLE 1 
Frequency of Accounting Losses by Year 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
number of 
firms 
 
% of losses 
 
Year 
 
Total 
number of 
firms 
 
% of losses 
1951 614 0.81% 1979 5,875 13.14%
1952 625 1.76% 1980 5,988 16.35%
1953 636 1.42% 1981 6,076 19.55%
1954 653 2.91% 1982 6,327 25.51%
1955 674 1.78% 1983 6,604 25.92%
1956 692 2.17% 1984 6,658 26.65%
1957 712 1.97% 1985 6,940 31.43%
1958 735 3.54% 1986 7,256 33.13%
1959 763 2.23% 1987 7,350 33.33%
1960 1,372 9.40% 1988 7,250 32.63%
1961 1,699 8.18% 1989 7,176 34.56%
1962 1,918 6.20% 1990 7,203 35.37%
1963 2,169 6.32% 1991 7,366 36.32%
1964 2,334 5.36% 1992 7,798 34.87%
1965 2,489 4.06% 1993 8,901 32.00%
1966 2,666 4.01% 1994 9,310 28.94%
1967 2,846 4.88% 1995 10,108 31.48%
1968 3,430 5.80% 1996 10,313 32.14%
1969 3,634 8.91% 1997 10,056 33.99%
1970 3,704 15.31% 1998 10,303 39.25%
1971 3,895 13.71% 1999 10,257 40.13%
1972 4,076 8.88% 2000 9,531 41.75%
1973 4,467 8.46% 2001 7,967 45.86%
1974 5,885 16.86% 1951-60 7,476 3.44%
1975 5,917 18.34% 1961-70 26,889 7.28%
1976 5,953 14.53% 1971-80 54,001 13.95%
1977 6,009 13.91% 1981-90 68,840 30.09%
1978 5,936 12.37% 1991-01 101,910 35.96%
   All years 259,719 25.84%
 
Variable Definition 
Accounting losses are negative values of net income (Compustat item no. 172). 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Accounting Conservatism, Percentage of Small Firms, ∆GDP, ∆IP, and CFO By Decade 
 
Time 
 
NOPACC 
 
SMALL 
 
∆GDP 
 
∆IP 
 
CFOA 
Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
           
1951-60 -0.011  -0.007 0.285 0.274 0.035 0.032 0.028 0.035 0.101 0.104 
1961-70 -0.015  -0.018 0.452 0.438 0.042 0.045 0.054 0.056 0.084 0.087 
1971-80 -0.015 -0.015 0.592 0.617 0.032 0.040 0.035 0.042 0.074 0.073 
1981-90 -0.034 -0.032 0.641 0.640 0.032 0.035 0.019 0.024 0.041 0.036 
1991-2001 -0.052 -0.043 0.665 0.665 0.033 0.038 0.032 0.038 0.013 0.016 
           
 
Panel B: NBER Definitions of Recession/Expansion Subperiods 
 
 Recession 
 
Aug 1953 – May 1954 
Sept 1957 – Apr 1958 
May 1960 – Feb 1961 
Jan 1970 – Nov 1970 
Dec 1973 – Mar 1975 
Feb 1980 – July 1980 
Aug 1981 – Nov 1982 
Aug 1990 – Mar 1991 
Apr 2001 – Dec 2001 
 
Expansion 
 
Nov 1949 – Jul 1953 
Jun 1954 – Aug 1957 
May 1958 – Apr 1960 
Mar 1961 – Dec 1969 
Dec 1970 – Nov 1973 
Apr 1975 – Jan 1980 
Aug 1980 – Jul 1981 
Dec 1982 – July 1990 
Apr 1991 – Mar 2001 
 
Variable Definitions 
NOPACC, or non-operating accruals, is defined as total accruals (net income – cash flow from operations) minus 
operating accruals (∆accounts receivable + ∆inventories + ∆prepaid expenses - ∆accounts payable- ∆taxes payable) 
plus depreciation and amortization expenses, all divided by beginning period total assets.  
 
SMALL is the percentage of Compustat firms whose total assets are less than 25th percentile of the total assets of 
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for that year. 
 
∆GDP is the annual percentage change in real gross domestic product, compiled by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.  ∆IP is the annual percentage change in total industrial production,  compiled by the Federal Reserve. 
 
CFOA is cash flows from operations divided by beginning period total assets.  For the years 1987-2001, we use 
Compustat item no. 308.  From 1971-1986, CFO is funds from operations minus ∆working capital (∆current assets 
+ ∆ short-term debt – ∆current liabilities – ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation expense plus ∆deferred income taxes – ∆working capital). 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) divides the U.S. economy into two economic environments: 
expansions and recessions.    Expansions are from the trough to the peak of business growth and recessions are from 
the peak to trough of business growth. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Coefficients Among Frequency of Losses, Accounting Conservatism, Percentage 
of Small Firms, Macroeconomic Productivity, and CFO 
 
Variable %LOSSES 
 
NOPACC SMALL RECESS ∆GDP ∆IP CFOA 
%LOSSES 1.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.5567 
(0.0001) 
 
 0.9031 
(0.0001) 
-0.0507 
(0.7237) 
-0.2066 
(0.1458) 
-0.1965 
(0.1669) 
-0.9425 
(0.0001) 
NOPACC -0.5163 
(0.0001) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.4784 
(0.0004) 
 
 0.3536 
(0.0109) 
-0.3040 
(0.0301) 
0.0339 
(0.8134) 
0.5471 
(0.0001) 
SMALL 0.8741 
(0.0001) 
-0.5850 
(0.0001) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0854 
(0.5511) 
 
-0.1829 
(0.1990) 
-0.1693 
(0.2351) 
-0.8134 
(0.0001) 
RECESS -0.0205 
(0.8867) 
0.4035 
(0.0033) 
-0.1637 
(0.2510) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
 -0.7422 
(0.0001) 
 
 -0.6092 
(0.0001) 
0.2141 
(0.1314) 
∆GDP -0.2512 
(0.0754) 
-0.2744 
(0.0514) 
-0.1345 
(0.3468) 
-0.7133 
(0.0001) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.5421 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1039 
(0.4679) 
∆IP 
 
-0.2268 
(0.1096) 
0.0070 
(0.9609) 
-0.1555 
(0.2760) 
-0.5760 
(0.0001) 
0.5602 
(0.0001) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0667 
(0.6418) 
 
CFOA 
 
-0.9203 
(0.0001) 
 
0.5752 
(0.0001) 
-0.8622 
(0.0001) 
0.2280 
(0.1075) 
0.1386 
(0.3321) 
0.0985 
(0.4916) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal. P-values are 
presented in parentheses. 
 
Variable Definitions 
%LOSSES is the percentage of accounting losses reported for each year. 
 
NOPACC is non-operating accruals defined as total accruals (net income – cash flow from operations) 
minus operating accruals (∆accounts receivable + ∆inventories + ∆prepaid expenses - ∆accounts payable- 
∆taxes payable) plus depreciation and amortization expenses, all divided by beginning period total assets.  
 
SMALL is the percentage of Compustat firms whose total assets are less than 25th percentile of the total 
assets of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for that year. 
 
RECESS equals one if the year is included in an NBER recession period, and zero otherwise.  The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) divides the U.S. economy into two economic environments: 
expansions and recessions.  Expansions are from the trough to the peak of business growth and recessions 
are from the peak to trough of business growth.  ∆GDP is the annual percentage change in real gross 
domestic product   Real GDP is compiled monthly by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  ∆IP is the 
annual percentage change in total industrial production.  It is compiled monthly by the Federal Reserve. 
 
CFOA is cash flows from operations divided by beginning period total assets.  For the years 1987-2001, we 
use Compustat item no. 308.  From 1971-1986, CFO is funds from operations minus ∆working capital 
(∆current assets + ∆ short-term debt – ∆current liabilities – ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense plus ∆deferred income taxes – ∆working capital). 
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TABLE 4 
 
OLS Regressions of Frequency of Losses on Accounting Conservatism, Percentage of 
Small Firms, Macroeconomic Productivity, and CFO 
 
%LOSSESt = β0 + β1NOPACCt + β2SMALLt + β3BUSCYCt + β4CFOAt + εt 
 
Model Intercept NOPACC SMALL BUSCYC CFOA Adj. R2 
1 0.095*** -3.359***    38.0% 
 (4.36) (-5.62)     
       
2 -0.180*** -1.252*** 0.796***   85.2% 
 (-7.40) (-3.72) (12.55)    
       
3 0.150*** -0.491*** 0.374*** 0.041*** -2.408*** 95.6% 
β3=RECESS (4.22) (-3.36) (7.04) (4.43) (-10.36)  
       
4 0.167*** -0.621** 0.376*** -0.001*** -2.181*** 94.9% 
β3=∆GDP (4.29) (-2.61) (6.55) (-3.29) (-8.82)  
       
5 0.168*** -0.330 0.378*** -0.002*** -2.328*** 94.6% 
β3=∆IP (4.14) (-1.44) (6.36) (-2.74) (-9.09)  
  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-
tailed test.  In panel B, t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
 
Variable Definitions 
%LOSSES is the percentage of accounting losses reported for each year. 
 
NOPACC is mean non-operating accruals, defined as total accruals (net income – cash flow from 
operations) minus operating accruals (∆accounts receivable + ∆inventories + ∆prepaid expenses - 
∆accounts payable- ∆taxes payable) plus depreciation and amortization expenses, all divided by beginning 
period total assets.  
 
SMALL is the percentage of Compustat firms whose total assets are less than 25th percentile of the total 
assets of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for that year. 
 
BUSCYC is the U.S. business cycle.  We represent BUSCYC using three different measures. The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) divides the U.S. economy into two economic environments: 
expansions and recessions.  Expansions are from the trough to the peak of business growth and recessions 
are from the peak to trough of business growth.  RECESS equals one if the year is included in an NBER 
recession period, and zero otherwise.  ∆GDP is the annual percentage change in real gross domestic 
product   Real GDP is compiled monthly by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  ∆IP is the annual 
percentage change in total industrial production.  It is compiled monthly by the Federal Reserve. 
 
CFOA is cash flows from operations divided by beginning period total assets.  For the years 1987-2001, we 
use Compustat item no. 308.  From 1971-1986, CFO is funds from operations minus ∆working capital 
(∆current assets + ∆ short-term debt – ∆current liabilities – ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense plus ∆deferred income taxes – ∆working capital). 
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TABLE 5 
Using Return on Assets (ROA) as the Dependent Variable 
 
Panel A: ROA By Decade 
 
Time Period Mean Median 
1951-1960  0.072 0.068 
1961-1970  0.056 0.054 
1971-1980  0.042 0.047 
1981-1990 -0.023 0.031 
1991-2001 -0.096 0.016 
 
Panel B: OLS Regressions of ROA on Accounting Conservatism, Percentage of 
Small Firms, Macroeconomic Productivity, and CFO 
 
ROAt = β0 + β1NOPACCt + β2SMALLt + β3BUSCYCt + β4CFOAt + εt 
 
Model Intercept NOPACC SMALL BUSCYC CFOA Adj. R2 
       
1 0.027*** -0.010 -0.027*** 0.001*** 0.405*** 94.8% 
β3=∆GDP (4.39) (-0.26) (-2.99) (3.59) (11.54)  
       
2 0.024*** 0.010 -0.027*** -0.001*** 0.430*** 92.8% 
β3=RECESS 
 
3 
β3=∆IP 
(3.73) 
 
0.025*** 
(3.64) 
(0.26) 
 
-0.032 
(-0.82) 
(-2.86) 
 
-0.029***
(-2.85) 
(-2.86) 
 
0.0003* 
(1.85) 
(10.41) 
 
0.449*** 
(10.32) 
 
 
92.2% 
        
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-
tailed test.  In panel B, t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
 
Variable Definitions 
ROA is the median return on assets for all firms in year t.  
 
NOPACC, non-operating accruals, is defined as total accruals (net income – cash flow from operations) 
minus operating accruals (∆accounts receivable + ∆inventories + ∆prepaid expenses - ∆accounts payable- 
∆taxes payable) plus depreciation and amortization expenses, all divided by beginning period total assets.  
 
SMALL is the percentage of Compustat firms whose total assets are less than 25th percentile of the total 
assets of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for that year. 
 
BUSCYC is the U.S. business cycle.  We represent Buscyc using three different measures. The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) divides the U.S. economy into two economic environments: 
expansions and recessions.  Expansions are from the trough to the peak of business growth and recessions 
are from the peak to trough of business growth.  RECESS equals one if the year is included in an NBER 
recession period, and zero otherwise.  ∆GDP is the annual percentage change in real gross domestic 
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product   Real GDP is compiled monthly by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  ∆IP is the annual 
percentage change in total industrial production.  It is compiled monthly by the Federal Reserve. 
 
CFOA is cash flows from operations divided by beginning period total assets.  For the years 1987-2001, we 
use Compustat item no. 308.  From 1971-1986, CFO is funds from operations minus ∆working capital 
(∆current assets + ∆ short-term debt – ∆current liabilities – ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense plus ∆deferred income taxes – ∆working capital). 
 
 
 
 
  44 
 
  
 
TABLE 6 
Sensitivity Analysis for Alternative Accounting Conservatism Measures 
 
Panel A: Alternative Conservatism Measures  by Decade 
 
 Earnings-Return Measure(E-R) Market-to-Book Ratio(MB) 
Time Period Mean Median Mean Median 
1951-1960 0.093 0.122 2.02 2.03 
1961-1970 0.110 0.105 2.61 2.39 
1971-1980 0.296 0.318 1.64 1.30 
1981-1990 0.408 0.422 2.49 2.80 
1991-2000 0.365 0.309 3.02 3.39 
 
Panel B: OLS Regression of Frequency of Losses on Alternative Accounting 
Conservatism Measures, Percentage of Small Firms, Macroeconomic Productivity 
and CFO 
 
%LOSSESt = β0 + β1 ALTCNSVt + β2 SMALLt + β3 BUSCYCt + β4 CFOAt + εt 
 
Model Intercept E-R SMALL BUSCYC CFOA Adj. R2 
       
1 
β3=∆GDP 
 
0.277*** 
(5.66) 
0.130*** 
(3.88) 
0.125* 
(1.97) 
-0.005** 
(-2.44) 
-2.883*** 
(-11.54) 
93.6% 
2 
β3=∆IP 
 
0.210*** 
(5.71) 
0.082** 
(2.59) 
0.280*** 
(4.21) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.63) 
-2.565*** 
(11.79) 
94.1% 
3 
β3=RECESS 
 
0.251*** 
(5.94) 
0.111*** 
(3.36) 
0.145** 
(2.37) 
0.035*** 
(3.22) 
-3.003*** 
(-12.72) 
94.1% 
                           Intercept         MB            SMALL       BUSCYC          CFOA         Adj. R2   
       
4 
β3=∆GDP 
 
0.236*** 
(3.55) 
-0.007 
(-0.75) 
0.382*** 
(4.34) 
-0.005** 
(-2.17) 
-3.327*** 
(-13.42) 
91.9% 
5 
β3=∆IP 
 
0.244*** 
(3.69) 
-0.007 
(-0.82) 
0.356*** 
(4.04) 
-0.002** 
(-2.28) 
-3.377*** 
(-13.84) 
91.9% 
6 
β3=RECESS 
 
0.206*** 
(3.26) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
0.381*** 
(4.58) 
0.040*** 
(3.23) 
-3.457*** 
(-14.92) 
92.7% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-
tailed test.  In panel B, t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
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Variable Definitions 
%LOSSES is the percentage of accounting losses reported for each year. 
 
E-R is the estimated coefficient γ2 from the following annual cross-sectional regression: EPSit/Priceit-1 = α0 
+ α1DUMit + γ0Returnit + γ1 (Returnit*DUMit )+ εit, where EPSit is the earnings per share of firm i in fiscal 
year t, Pricei,t-1 is the price per share at the beginning of the fiscal year, Returnit is the return of firm i over 
the 12 months beginning nine months prior to the end of the fiscal year t, and DUMit is a dummy variable 
set equal to one if Rit is negative and 0 otherwise.  
 
MB is market price per share divided by book value per share at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
SMALL is the percentage of Compustat firms whose total assets are less than 25th percentile of the total 
assets of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for that year. 
 
BUSCYC is the U.S. business cycle.  We represent BUSCYC using three different measures. The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) divides the U.S. economy into two economic environments: 
expansions and recessions.  Expansions are from the trough to the peak of business growth and recessions 
are from the peak to trough of business growth.  RECESS equals one if the year is included in an NBER 
recession period, and zero otherwise.  ∆GDP is the annual percentage change in real gross domestic 
product   Real GDP is compiled monthly by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  ∆IP is the annual 
percentage change in total industrial production.  It is compiled monthly by the Federal Reserve. 
 
CFOA is cash flows from operations divided by beginning period total assets.  For the years 1987-2001, we 
use Compustat item no. 308.  From 1971-1986, CFO is funds from operations minus ∆working capital 
(∆current assets + ∆ short-term debt – ∆current liabilities – ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense plus ∆deferred income taxes – ∆working capital). 
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TABLE 7 
Examination of Time-Series Trends in the Data 
 
Panel A:  OLS Regression of Change in Percentage of Accounting Losses on 
Changes in Accounting Conservatism, Percentage of Small Firms, Macroeconomic 
Productivity, and CFO 
 
∆%LOSSESt = β0 + β1 ∆NOPACCt + β2 ∆SMALLt + β3 BUSCYCt + β4∆CFOAt + εt 
 
Model Intercept ∆NOPACC ∆SMALL BUSCYC ∆CFOA Adj. R2 
1 
β3=∆GDP 
 
2 
β3=∆IP 
 
0.027*** 
(4.33) 
 
0.019*** 
(5.79) 
0.035 
(0.19) 
 
-0.107 
(-0.72) 
0.370** 
(2.01) 
 
0.249* 
(1.68) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.01) 
 
-0.004*** 
(-7.19) 
-0.316 
(-0.93) 
 
-1.10*** 
(-3.73) 
32.1% 
 
 
57.1% 
3 
β3=RECESS 
 
-0.003 
(-0.78) 
0.035 
(0.19) 
0.410** 
(2.21) 
0.029*** 
(3.78) 
-0.671* 
(-1.86) 
30.0% 
 
Panel B:  OLS Regression of Percentage of Accounting Losses Accounting 
Conservatism, Percentage of Small Firms, Macroeconomic Productivity, CFO, and 
a Trend Factor 
 
%LOSSESt = β0 + β1 NOPACCt + β2 SMALLt + β3 BUSCYCt + β4CFOAt + β5TRENDt + εt 
 
Model Intercept NOPACC SMALL BUSCYC CFOA TREND Adj.R2 
1 
β3=∆GDP 
 
2 
β3=∆IP 
 
0.142*** 
(3.21) 
 
0.140*** 
(3.07) 
-0.575** 
(-2.40) 
 
-0.285 
(-1.24) 
0.286*** 
(3.02) 
 
0.278*** 
(2.85) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.24) 
 
-0.002*** 
(-2.75) 
-1.842*** 
(-4.88) 
 
-1.953*** 
(-5.02) 
0.002 
(1.18) 
 
0.002 
(1.27) 
94.9% 
 
 
94.7% 
3 
β3=RECESS 
 
0.125*** 
(3.10) 
-0.449** 
(-2.13) 
0.284*** 
(3.23) 
0.041*** 
(4.41) 
-2.065*** 
(-5.85) 
0.002 
(1.28) 
96.7% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-
tailed test.  In panel B, t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
 
Variable Definitions 
%LOSSES is the percentage of accounting losses reported for each year. 
 
NOPACC, non-operating accruals, is defined as total accruals (net income – cash flow from operations) 
minus operating accruals (∆accounts receivable + ∆inventories + ∆prepaid expenses - ∆accounts payable- 
∆taxes payable) plus depreciation and amortization expenses, all divided by beginning period total assets.  
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SMALL is the percentage of Compustat firms whose total assets are less than 25th percentile of the total 
assets of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for that year. 
 
BUSCYC is the U.S. business cycle.  We represent Buscyc using three different measures. The National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) divides the U.S. economy into two economic environments: 
expansions and recessions.  Expansions are from the trough to the peak of business growth and recessions 
are from the peak to trough of business growth.  RECESS equals one if the year is included in an NBER 
recession period, and zero otherwise.  ∆GDP is the annual percentage change in real gross domestic 
product   Real GDP is compiled monthly by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  ∆IP is the annual 
percentage change in total industrial production.  It is compiled monthly by the Federal Reserve. 
 
CFOA is cash flows from operations divided by beginning period total assets.  For the years 1987-2001, we 
use Compustat item no. 308.  From 1971-1986, CFO is funds from operations minus ∆working capital 
(∆current assets + ∆ short-term debt – ∆current liabilities – ∆cash).  Prior to 1971, CFO is net income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense plus ∆deferred income taxes – ∆working capital). 
 
TREND equals the calendar year minus 1950. 
 
In Panel A, ∆ indicates the change as the value in year t minus the value in year t-1. 
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TABLE 8 
Differences in the Characteristics of Small vs. Large and Loss vs. Profit Firms (1987 – 2001) 
 
Panel A: Univariate differences in firm characteristics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Small Firms 
(n=38,015) 
 
Large Firms 
(n=33,397) 
Test statistic of 
difference between 
means/medians/% 
 
Loss Firms 
(n=23,912) 
 
Profit Firms 
(n=47,500) 
Test statistic of 
difference between 
means/medians 
 
SEG1 
     Percentage 
 
0.7908 
 
0.5698 
 
65.45*** 
 
0.7566 
 
0.6527 
 
28.43*** 
IDVOL 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
0.0536 
0.0473 
 
0.0264 
0.0226 
 
163.47*** 
157.56*** 
 
0.0583 
0.0522 
 
0.0322 
0.0275 
 
122.45*** 
127.08*** 
CFI 
     Mean 
     Median 
 
-0.1340 
-0.0955 
 
-0.1120 
-0.0890 
 
-17.92*** 
-6.62*** 
 
-0.1427 
-0.0886 
 
-0.1141 
-0.0926 
 
-18.33*** 
             0.92   
NEW 
     Percentage 
 
0.0752 
 
0.0722 
 
             1.55  
 
0.0701 
 
0.0756 
 
-2.68** 
DELIST 
     Percentage 
 
0.0712 
 
0.0493 
 
12.35*** 
 
0.0835 
 
0.0496 
 
16.55*** 
       
Panel B: Multivariate probit analysis of firm size and accounting losses on firm characteristics (n=71,412) 
Pr(Variableit) = β0 + β1 SEG1it+ β2 IDVOLit + β3 CFIit + β4 NEW +β5 DELISTit + εit 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Model 
 
Intercept 
 
 
SEG1 
 
IDVOL 
 
CFI 
 
NEW 
 
DELIST 
SMALLFIRM 
 
Pooled -1.6886 
(0.0001) 
 
0.4826 
(0.0001) 
36.6054 
(0.0001) 
-0.2885 
(0.0001) 
0.2252 
(0.0001) 
0.0309 
(0.1727) 
 Fama-MacBeth 
 
-1.7941 
(0.0001) 
 
0.4182 
(0.0001) 
40.5029 
(0.0001) 
-0.4917 
(0.0152) 
0.1722 
(0.1910) 
0.0527 
(0.0893) 
LOSSFIRM Pooled 
 
-1.6505 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0815 
(0.0001) 
24.9768 
(0.0001) 
-0.5901 
(0.0001) 
0.1146 
(0.0001) 
0.2201 
(0.0001) 
 Fama-MacBeth 
 
-1.7254 
(0.0001) 
0.0727 
(0.0168) 
28.1834 
(0.0001) 
-0.6240 
(0.0002) 
0.1688 
(0.0391) 
0.2428 
(0.0018) 
  49  
 
SMALLFIRM is an indicator variable that equals one if the total assets of the firm are less than the 25th percentile of total assets for NYSE firms in a given year 
and zero otherwise. LOSSFIRM is an indicator variable that equals one if net income is negative and zero otherwise. SEG1 is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the firm has a single business segment and zero otherwise. IDVOL is the idiosyncratic component of daily stock return volatility, estimated each firm-year by 
regressing daily returns on the CRSP equally-weighted market return and computing the standard deviation of the residuals. CFI is cash flows from investing 
activities minus R&D expenses, divided by total assets. NEW is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm appears for the first time on the annual industrial 
Compustat tape and zero otherwise. DELIST is an indicator variable that equals one in the last year that the firm appears on the Compustat Research tape.  
* ** *** indicate significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.0001 levels, respectively. 
 
